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Abstract—In this paper we explore how recent technolo-
gies can improve the security of optical networks. In par-
ticular, we study how to use quantum key distribution 
(QKD) in common optical network infrastructures and pro-
pose a method to overcome its distance limitations. QKD is 
the first technology offering information theoretic secret-
key distribution that relies only on the fundamental prin-
ciples ofquantum physics. Point-to-point QKD devices have 
reached a mature industrial state; however, these devices 
are severely limited in distance, since signals at the quan-
tum level (e.g., single photons) are highly affected by the 
losses in the communication channel and intermediate de-
vices. To overcome this limitation, intermediate nodes (i.e., 
repeaters) are used. Both quantum-regime and trusted, 
classical repeaters have been proposed in the QKD litera-
ture, but only the latter can be implemented in practice. 
As a novelty, we propose here a new QKD network model 
based on the use of not fully trusted intermediate nodes, 
referred to as weakly trusted repeaters. This approach 
forces the attacker to simultaneously break several paths 
to get access to the exchanged key, thus improving signifi-
cantly the security of the network. We formalize the model 
using network codes and provide real scenarios that allow 
users to exchange secure keys over metropolitan optical 
networks using only passive components. Moreover, the 
theoretical framework allows one to extend these scenarios 
not only to accommodate more complex trust constraints, 
but also to consider robustness and resiliency constraints 
on the network. 
I . INTRODUCTION 
O ptical network design has evolved over time to meet different challenges: high bandwidth, deployment 
flexibility, multiuser requirements, etc. Other characteris-
tics were considered secondary a t the time and added later, 
as their need or convenience became more pressing. Secur-
ity has been one of these secondary requirements. I t was 
usually taken for granted in optical networks owing to 
the technical difficulty of spying the signal carried by an 
optical fiber [1]. However, technological advances and 
transformations in the structure of the network changed 
the panorama, and this is no longer t rue [2,3]. On the 
one hand, sensitive detectors and small transponders are 
nowadays able to perform, a t a fraction of the cost and 
size, the operations that previously needed rack-sized 
equipment. On the other, certain network architectures 
simply do not lend themselves to security [4,5]. As an ex-
ample, downstream signals in a gigabit passive optical 
network (GPON) arrive to all users and are only dismissed 
by a well-behaved optical network terminator. Nothing 
prevents them from actually recording the signals. 
Classically, there are several ways to provide security in 
a network. The most used one is just to add a cryptographic 
layer—independent of the optical network layer—that ci-
phers all the communications in the network. In a typical 
setting, a session key is exchanged in some way, for exam-
ple, using asymmetric (public-key) encryption and its 
underlying infrastructure (e.g., RSA and certification 
authorities) or by having exchanged previously a physical 
storage medium with a pool of keys. Then, the exchanged 
key is used for a given maximum amount of time or of ci-
phered data size. When the pool is exhausted, a new one 
must be exchanged. In high security settings, no single 
channel is considered safe enough, and a mixture of several 
methods (physical and RSA, and a t different times using 
different paths) is used. While these are well-known tech-
niques, they also have their drawbacks. For instance, the 
security of RSA is still an unproven assumption. Although 
its exponentially difficult nature has still to be really chal-
lenged,1 the continuous growth in power of the algorithms 
and computers make for a constant revision of the recom-
mended key size. What once was considered secure during 
the age of the Earth , was actually broken in 17 years [6]. 
The recommendations for security have steadily grown 
from a few hundred bits to 2,048 bits [7] in length or even 
close to 15 kbits for certain operations tha t require a level 
of security equal to symmetric-key algorithms [8]. These 
are even bigger when long term security ( 20 years) is re-
quired. Hence, if a technology is able to produce a contin-
uous supply of high quality symmetric keys all over a 
network, it would be a welcome addition to its capabilities, 
in some cases as valuable as bandwidth itself. In this 
regard, the purpose of this paper is to explore a recent 
1Except for a quantum computer that , in principle, is able to break the RSA. 
Whether such a computer will be built is still a matter of debate. 
technology, namely quantum key distribution (QKD), to 
provide security in an optical network and, in particular, 
to propose some means to overcome its main limitation 
in distance through the application of ideas from network 
coding. 
Quantum key distribution [9] allows two legitimate 
parties to generate a secret key even in the presence of 
an eavesdropper. The key is known only to the parties, 
since the information leaked to an eavesdropper can be 
bounded as tightly as they want. Hence, QKD is a technol-
ogy able to distribute information-theoretic secure keys. 
The measurement of a quantum system in an unknown 
state modifies it (except if the same basis is used for mea-
surement and coding—state preparation), thus allowing 
one to detect the signals suspected to have been read by 
an eavesdropper. No computational complexity assump-
tions are needed. Jus t the laws of physics and, of course, 
common assumptions in cryptographic scenarios (e.g., 
the eavesdropper cannot control the devices at his will). 
A QKD protocol requires a quantum channel and an 
authenticated classical channel. The quantum channel is 
a communication channel supporting the transmission of 
quantum signals that are typically encoded as qubits: 
two-state quantum systems such as the horizontal/vertical 
polarization states of a single photon. An optical fiber per-
forms very well as a qubit carrier; hence, a purely optical 
network is a very good candidate to implement a quantum 
network, i.e., a network based on the exchange of quantum 
signals. 
QKD technology is delicate, since it must deal with sig-
nals at the quantum level. However, it has reached the 
point where devices able to work unattended during 
months are commercially available [10,11]. As in any 
medium, photons suffer an exponential attenuation while 
propagating through the fiber. In conventional communica-
tions, this is usually solved by using an amplifier, but in 
quantum communications this cannot be done, as amplify-
ing a signal is just a measurement made to clone it, some-
thing forbidden at the quantum level by the “no cloning” 
principle: if a signal is unknown (i.e., we do not know for 
sure whether the qubit codes are “1” or “0”—the single 
photon is in a horizontal or vertical state of polarization, 
for example), the copy cannot be made exact [12]. A mea-
surement made to obtain information results in an increase 
of the error rate in the signal, something that allows the 
detection of an eavesdropper. 
Optical fiber is at the core of today’s data networks be-
cause of its capability to support the bandwidth demand, 
relatively cheap manufacture, easy deployment, and long 
life. The bulk of the communications is carried by optical 
fiber. Optical networks are pervasive nowadays, from long 
haul to fiber-to-the-home. Its bandwidth capacity has put 
much pressure on the electronics in order to keep pace with 
the raw transmission rate. Bandwidth, increase in reliabil-
ity, and low power consumption have made it preferable to 
keep as much of the network in the purely optical domain. 
Therefore, most of the networks being deployed today are 
passive optical networks (PON). These can work under 
many different schemes, like the aforementioned GPON 
or WDM-PON,2 but all of them have the characteristic that 
no active elements perturb the optical path—at least under 
typical metropolitan area distances. Thus, it is possible to 
create a direct, uninterrupted, optical path among two 
nodes in the network that is also able to support a quantum 
channel for QKD. 
This allows one to seamlessly integrate QKD in optical 
networks, where a quantum channel can be established be-
tween any two points in the network. In this regard, a flur-
ry of activity has started in the field [13–19]; nevertheless, 
the distance limitation is still a problem. Current distance 
records are around 260 km for a link with experimental 
superconducting detectors [20]. This means the capability 
to tolerate around 50 dB of losses, while commercial imple-
mentations are still not capable of going beyond 20 dB. If 
we take into account the insertion losses of typical optical 
components (e.g., filters, multiplexers, splitters, etc.), this 
barely allows one to span a single access network.3 To alle-
viate these problems, specific networks devised for QKD 
have been proposed [10,19,21–23]. However, these are 
not really practical since, on the one hand, the cost of using 
and deploying special infrastructures in populated envi-
ronments, like in cities, is prohibitively high, and, on the 
other, it does not solve the fundamental problem of limited 
reach. 
Only quantum repeaters [24] would allow one to extend 
the reach without limits, but these are far beyond any prac-
tical technology today. Beyond quantum repeaters, we are 
forced to use trusted repeaters to overcome these losses. 
A trusted nodes network [25] links two places through a 
series of shorter links tha t create a secret key. The key pro-
duced in the first link is relayed to the destination by en-
coding it with the keys created in the intermediate ones. 
Therefore, the key is known by all intermediate nodes, 
making the key secure only as long as all these are trusted. 
If a spy is successful attacking one node, the key is known 
for all the nodes. Since this is the only practical possibility, 
all network test beds deployed up to date (e.g., [10,19,21– 
23]) make use of them in their design. The typical trusted 
node has a complex design [22]: it includes several QKD 
devices (one to complete the pair needed in each link) 
and a computer to do all the associated key management, 
etc., which makes it even harder to certify [26,27] to any 
security level. The reliance on all these intermediate nodes 
makes trusted repeater networks expensive and not accep-
table by many users. 
We propose here a new approach to alleviate the reliance 
condition on trusted repeaters and apply it to the case of 
optical networks using standard components. Our work 
is based on the new paradigm provided by network coding 
[28]. The introduction of network coding by Ahlswede et al . 
was a complete revolution in network theory: simple flow 
processing by the nodes allows one to improve different 
2
 Wavelength division multiplexing–PON. 
3
 Although the new generation of QKD devices, able to withstand approxi-
mately 30 dB, is about to make its debut beyond the laboratories, reach is 
still a problem. Even assuming perfect detectors, emitters working at 
several GHz, and new low-loss fiber, there is no possibility of having any 
reasonable key rate beyond 500 km. 
scenarios in terms of throughput, needed resources, and 
security. Here we use the idea of network codes to reduce 
the dependence on the trusted repeaters. We introduce 
conditional trust structures that guarantee that, as long 
as there is no cooperation between specified sets of weakly 
trusted repeaters, the distributed key remains fully secret. 
The name underscores the fact that some assumptions are 
no longer needed. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the 
basics of network coding and the wiretap network model 
that support our proposal. We have written the paper 
without assuming any previous knowledge about network 
coding; in consequence, this section is to a certain extent 
self-contained and should allow the reader to grasp the fun­
damental principles of network coding. In Section III we 
discuss the limitations of QKD and the need for intermedi­
ate repeaters. These repeaters are currently fully trusted, 
but using network coding principles we can impose a light­
er trust constraint on the repeaters and achieve the same 
information theoretic security. In Section IV we discuss the 
integration of weakly trusted repeaters on passive optical 
networks, and in Section V we describe some particular 
scenarios. Finally, we summarize the discussion and draw 
some future improvements in Section VI. 
I I . NETWORK CODING 
Network coding is a paradigm where the intermediate 
nodes, instead of simply forwarding the incoming flows 
through the outgoing paths (according to some routing 
algorithm), distribute a function of the inputs through each 
outgoing path. It was shown in [28] that linear combina­
tions of the inputs suffice to maximize multicast transmis­
sions. More generally, linear network codes allow one to 
improve on several other aspects of common networks, 
in particular, their security [29]. 
The application of network coding in optical networks 
has been widely studied in recent works. For instance, 
in [30–32] the authors improve the performance, robust­
ness, and reliability of unicast and multicast optical 
networks, while [33–35] focus on the new generation of 
passive optical networks commonly deployed in commer­
cial infrastructures. 
A. Notation and Definitions 
Let us consider a network over a directed acyclic multi-
graph Q defined by the tuple (V,E), where V is the set of 
vertices or nodes in the graph and E is the set of directed 
edges or links. We denote the adjacency in the network 
graph of the node v to the edge e using the notation 
e £ A(v). Two nodes in the graph, i; 1,1*2 £ V, can commu­
nicate if there exists an edge e such that e £ A(v1) and 
e £ A(v2). For convenience, we simplify the network model 
allowing every link to transmit a symbol taking values in 
the discrete finite alphabet T. Note that by allowing multi­
ple edges between two nodes we can generalize the model 
to links with different capacities. 
The network serves a subset of nodes in the graph called 
source nodes S. Every source s ∈ S generates a random 
message M s taking uniformly values from the discrete 
alphabet M s . We call M the message jointly generated 
by all sources and consequently taking values in M the 
direct product of all M s . 
In contrast to forward routing (see Fig. 1), routers in the 
network coding paradigm are allowed to output a function 
of the incoming flows. If we restrict the functions to linear 
combinations of the inputs, we can easily deduce that they 
also represent linear combinations of the source messages. 
We associate every edge e in the graph with
 e a mapping 
from M to F . 
Finally, let U be the set of user nodes, a subset of nodes in 
the graph. A user u ∈ U aims to receive with no error M u 
the messages sent by Su, a specific subset of S. We will de­
note, abusing notation, by Ye and Yu the random symbol 
sent through the edge e and the messages reaching the user 
u , respectively. 
B . Secur i ty 
Before we proceed to formalize the security framework, 
let us describe a network consisting of a single QKD link 
between two users (see Fig. 2). Logically, we can consider 
it to be composed by (i) a private or secure link, in which a 
random key rq is exchanged, and (ii) a public channel in 
which a message m is sent encrypted with a one-time 
pad between m and rq. This is equivalent to having a pri­
vate channel tha t a source s can use to send m to a user u. 
Therefore, we will consider every link in a QKD network to 
Fig. 1. Comparison of the forwarding paradigm with the network 
codes paradigm. The router on the left side of the figure only for­
wards the incoming packets, while the router on the right pro­
cesses the inputs and transmits a linear combination of the 
inputs through every outgoing link. 
rg + m 
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Fig. 2. A QKD link can be considered as composed by a private 
channel used for exchanging random secret keys rq and a public 
channel in which the key can help the source send a secret message 
r„ + m to the user. It is equivalent to considering both as a single 
private link connecting the source and the user. 
be a private link between its neighboring nodes. This 
restricts eavesdropping to the intermediate network nodes; 
only a curious router can gain access to network messages. 
This ability to extend the traditional security perimeter 
to also cover the communication channel between two 
QKD nodes is the consequence of the laws of quantum 
physics and is the key attribute of QKD. However, this 
property cannot be extended to classical repeaters. In 
essence, any classical repeater node in a chain of quantum 
links gets meaningful information [29]. To prevent the 
curious routers from accessing information, we can create 
extended source messages by adding randomness to the 
source messages. Formally, the messages are drawn from 
the direct product of the source alphabet M, and a random 
key alphabet /C. The negative effect of the extended source 
messages is, however, a reduction in the achievable trans-
mission rate, since the part devoted to the key transport 
increases the security but detracts from the information 
bandwidth. 
Let us consider a set of | VV| independent eavesdroppers. 
Every w G W may receive the messages traversing a fixed 
collection of nodes, or eavesdropping pattern Bw, to recover 
a subset of the source message Mw. In consequence an 
eavesdropper has access to YBw = {Ye:e G A(v),v GBW}, 
the messages traversing Bw. Note that the elements in 
W, i.e., eavesdroppers, are elements of the power set of V 
and in consequence potentially overlapping. We say that 
the intermediate nodes in the network graph are weakly 
trusted repeaters (WTR) to reflect the assumption that no 
further cooperation with the eavesdroppers is performed. 
Following [29], a network code is admissible over this 
eavesdrop network model if every user node u can recover 
Mu and the information that every eavesdropper w holds 
about Mw does not reduce its entropy: 
H(MW\YU) = 0 (1) 
and Vw G W 
H(MJYBJ = H(MW), (2) 
whereH( ·) andH(·\·) are Shannon’s entropy and Shannon’s 
conditional entropy, respectively [36]. These two conditions 
are called the secure and decodable conditions. Note that 
this is a generic definition, the special case in which there 
is one source and one user and the eavesdropper is inter-
ested in the whole message is just one of many possible 
configurations. 
C. Practical Scenarios 
A simple scenario that offers immediate gain for QKD 
using the network coding approach is shown in Fig. 3. In 
this scenario two parties, the source s and the user u, ex-
change a secure key relying in two intermediate nodes, t1 
and t2 as depicted in Fig. 3. The source generates a secret 
message M and a secret key K both taking values over 
the finite field GF(3). If either t1 or i2 tries to get any 
information about M, it is easy to verify that 
Fig. 3. In this network, the source s wishes to send a message m 
to the user u (possibly a secret key) in the presence of t1 and t2, two 
intermediate nodes that eavesdrop their incoming and outgoing 
links. If t1 and t2 limit their eavesdropping activities to non-
cooperative eavesdropping, they have no information about 
the source message m G M, where k is a random message from 
the random alphabet K. 
H(M\Yh) = H(M\Yh) = 0, (3) 
where Yt and Yt are the sets of extended messages tra-
versing t1 and t2, respectively. 
The previous scenario can be used to enable multicast 
key distribution, as shown in Fig. 4, without providing 
any further information to the intermediate routers: the 
extra links joining t1 and t2 with the second user w2 repli-
cate the links with u1. 
Consider now the scenario depicted in Fig. 5. In this 
scenario, proposed by Chan et al. in [37], four nodes 
(s1, S2, M1, and u2) exchange keys pairwise (m1 between 
Fig. 4. In this figure the source s distributes the same secret key 
to two different users u1 and u2. 
s i mi + Ik 
Fig. 5. This figure shows a network with two sources s1 and s2 
and two users u1 and u2. The sources, s1 and s2, transmit m1 and 
m2 to the users, u2 and u1, respectively, while no information is 
leaked to the intermediate nodes or the remaining users. 
s1 and u2, and m2 between S2 and u1) relying on one 
randomizing node t1 and one centralized node t2. In 
other words, u1 and u2 should be able to recover m2 and rti1, 
respectively, but not m1 and m2. In effect, the users recover 
the desired message by adding the incoming flows and 
H(M1|YB1) = H(M2\YU2) = 0. (4) 
It should be noted that H(M\Yt) = 0, H(M1\Yt) = 
H(M2\Y(2) = 0, but H(M\Yt) > 0. That is, the network 
code is admissible if t2 aims to recover either M1 or M2 
but not both. 
D. Byzantine Adversaries 
In the analysis presented in the previous sections the ad-
versaries have been described as passive eavesdroppers: 
they are assumed to be able to read the information 
stream but not to modify it. This kind of bound on the 
eavesdropping power might be a concern because QKD, 
in the absence of classical repeaters, provides their users 
with stronger security. However, this limitation on the 
eavesdropper is not actually a problem. In general, when 
dealing with the distribution of messages over a network, 
the security is studied against ^-bounded adversaries, 
i.e., adversaries in control of at most t nodes. These so-
called Byzantine adversaries are allowed to listen in 
their incoming links and output any message on their 
outgoing links. 
A network with ^-bounded adversaries is said to be 
secure if it provides the sources and users with perfect 
secrecy and perfect resiliency. Perfect secrecy is achieved 
if the adversaries get no meaningful information, in an in-
formation theoretic way, about the exchanged messages. 
Perfect resiliency means that ^-bounded adversaries are 
unable to stop the sources from reliably transmitting the 
messages to the users. Dolev et al. [38] showed that if a net-
work with one-way links has at least 3t + 1 node disjoint 
paths between a source and a user, the source can transmit 
messages with perfect secrecy and perfect resiliency (in the 
presence of £-bounded adversaries). In the network coding 
community Jaggi et al. [39] showed, surprisingly, that if 
there are 3t + 1 node disjoint paths, a source can transmit 
secure messages with rate C -t, where C is the network 
capacity. That is, the only rate reduction from full capacity 
is t, and no extra penalty is paid. 
Resiliency is a desirable property for QKD networks 
since a QKD link is in itself nonresilient; i.e., QKD links 
are not protected from denial of service attacks. However, 
with current QKD networks dealing with small sets of 
nodes, the need for 3t + 1 node disjoint paths is a 
strong constraint: for instance, if the network is to be 
secured against any three-bounded adversary, it has to 
provide 10 disjoint paths. Salvail et al. propose in [40] 
a weaker form of security: the network is secure if 
it provides perfect secrecy and message authenticity. 
Message authenticity is achieved if either the message 
reaches the user uncorrupted or the user and the source 
are aware that it is corrupted. A message authentication 
schema is proposed such that in a network with l disjoint 
paths, it can still provide message authenticity when, if 
there is a t least one uncorrupted path, the network can pro-
vide message authenticity. Their schema is said to be un-
forgeable because no intermediate node, or set of nodes, 
outside of the nodes belonging to the uncorrupt path have 
any information about the exchanged messages. This same 
kind of restriction can be imposed on the network code 
scenarios; eavesdropping patterns can be defined such that 
the eavesdroppers can tap any node except for nodes be-
longing to one uncorrupted path. With these eavesdropping 
patterns the authentication mechanism can be applied 
with the same security. 
I I I . QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS 
QKD devices use qubits as their information carriers. 
These qubits are described mathematically as vectors in 
a two-dimensional Hilbert space, while in practice, any 
two-dimensional quantum system can be used to encode 
a qubit. When qubits are used in a quantum communica-
tion system, such as a QKD device, photons are the usual 
choice for the physical realization. Properties like polariza-
tion, phase, or even time can be used to encode a qubit 
into a single photon, making them flexible choices that 
are also reasonably easy to transmit, detect, and manipu-
late: laser diodes, avalanche photodiodes, beam splitters, 
modulators, etc., are all the optical components needed. 
Photon qubits are transmitted through either free space 
(air) or optical fiber, the latter being the logical choice 
for communication networks. As any signal propagating 
through an absorbing medium, photons suffer an exponen-
tial attenuation when traveling through the fiber. These 
losses are harmful for the extremely sensitive QKD de-
vices, which are made to transmit and manipulate single 
photons. Moreover, the interaction of the photon qubit 
with the environment is actually indistinguishable from 
an eavesdropper manipulation, thus rendering the signal 
unusable for cryptographic purposes. This includes any 
at tempt to amplify the signal, which is basically an inter-
action with the qubit in order to know its s tate and copy 
it in many photons, something that cannot be done without 
introducing an error, the same error that is used to rule 
out the existence of an eavesdropper and tha t forms the 
basis of a QKD protocol. Under these conditions, a QKD 
device is limited to use fully transparent optical networks 
without active devices such as amplifiers or electro-optical 
converters, and, even in this case, its maximum reach is 
limited. 
A. Q K D Performance 
There are many factors that hinder the performance of a 
QKD system: far from ideal single-photon detectors or 
emitters are the two main ones; but even if they could 
be made perfect and work a t a very high speed rate , 
practical limits of QKD systems would be ultimately set 
by the absorptions in the quantum channel. A system 
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Fig. 6. Secret-key rate, in bits per qubit sent, of two different QKD 
systems, GYS and Clavis, using the BB84 protocol with decoy 
states as a function of the absorptions in the network. The ratio 
of the secret key is calculated using the asymptotic approximation 
proposed in [43]. The parameters considered for the GYS system 
can be found in [41]. In the Clavis system [42], we use an absorp-
tion value of 0.25 dB km for the fiber (both devices are transmit-
ting a t the 1550 nm window). Losses owing to network devices are 
depicted using a shadowed region. Note that the different regions 
are plotted in the order in which a hypothetical photon qubit would 
find them if it is connected throughan access network homed into a 
passive metropolitan ring and crosses two core nodes before being 
dropped to its final destination. 
working a t 10 GHz and with detectors 100% efficient4 
would have a maximum practical reach of 500 km using 
the best fiber available and working in 1550 nm, the most 
t ransparent window. 
As an example of the practical QKD limits, we calcu-
lated the secret key ra te using two different fiber-based 
QKD systems, GYS [41] and Clavis [42], and present them 
in Fig. 6. GYS was selected because it is a laboratory im-
plementation with typical components and parameters 
tha t has been widely used in the l i terature as a bench-
mark, while Clavis is a QKD system already available 
in the market . The lat ter is the development variant 
of the ID Quantique Vectis system, used to provide com-
mercial grade security based on QKD. The specific 
parameters for the systems are provided in the caption 
of Fig. 6. 
Although it is typical to present the secret-key ra te as a 
function of the distance in km, we show it as a function of 
the losses, which is the meaningful figure when using QKD 
in networks instead of a direct point-to-point link. This 
allows us to show (grayed out areas) the absorptions 
of common network components. This highlights the fact 
that in real optical networks they are the limiting factor. 
Figure 6 depicts the key exchange of two nodes that are 
located in different access networks of a metropolitan area 
network (its structure is detailed in Section IV). The 
absorptions are presented in the same order in which a 
real qubit would find them. 
4
 Compared to the 5 MHz and 10% quantum detector efficiency of the 
systems commercially available today. 
Following the standard procedures for computing the se-
cret key rate , the quantum bit error ra te is roughly approxi-
mated as a function of the losses and the dark count ra te , 
which is assumed to be constant (1.7 × 10-6 in the GYS 
experiment and 2 × 10-5 for the Clavis system). Since 
losses reduce the noise-to-signal ratio, the secret key ra te 
in Fig. 6 can also be regarded as a function of the quantum 
bit error ra te . 
The secret key ra te shows the amount of secret key ex-
tracted per transmitted qubit. To calculate the secret 
key rate per second, it has to be multiplied by the emitter 
frequency (5–10 MHz for current commercial QKD sys-
tems). As expected, the secret key rate decreases exponen-
tially with the losses up to a point where it goes to zero 
rather abruptly. This effect has nothing to do with the op-
tical network, but with the way in which the secret key 
has to be extracted. When losses are higher, the signal-
to-noise ratio is worse and the quantum bit error rate 
grows. Since in cryptography one has to deal with the 
worst possible case, all errors have to be attributed to an 
attacker. More quantum bit error rate means, then, that 
in the last step in a QKD communication, known as 
privacy amplification, a high number of bits have to be 
discarded to account for the presence of a hypothetical 
eavesdropper. 
In any case, Fig. 6 clearly shows tha t there is a max-
imum number of losses tha t can be tolerated. This is ap-
proximately 20 dB for the commercial system. This loss 
budget, which in a point-to-point link could amount to 
80 km of s tandard optical fiber, is not enough to cross 
(without repeaters) a typical metropolitan a rea network. 
I t should be noted tha t continuous variable QKD is an 
al ternative technology for use in future telecom networks 
since it is intrinsically more adapted to WDM [18], and 
although it has classically been considered highly limited 
in distance, recent experiments show tha t this technol-
ogy is also capable of achieving the aforementioned 
80 km [44]. New types of QKD devices could also be well 
suited for network integration [45]. I t is to be noted tha t 
tolerance to losses and high bit ra tes a re complementary 
magnitudes, since high speed systems would be, in gen-
eral , able to reach farther away with a useful key ra te . 
B . T rus ted Repea te rs 
Modern optical networks have embraced the full optical 
domain model; hence, they are capable of transporting 
quantum signals. There have been many studies trying 
to integrate QKD in optical networks [14–17,19]. However, 
the distance limitation still persists. As mentioned in the 
Introduction, there are only two ways to overcome this. The 
best one is to build a repeater or amplifier in the quantum 
regime. This is a possibility not ruled out by theory and 
with good experimental progress [24] but one that , by all 
accounts, is still many years in the future. The other one 
is to build a classical repeater that is actually a measure-
ment device tha t relays the keys produced in the first quan-
tum link. 
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Fig. 7. Thereachcanbeextendedbyallowingtrustedintermediate 
nodes to forward the key. The gray area marks the distance lim-
itation of the QKD system with the emitter source a t s. (a) Detail 
of the messages exchanged with a trusted repeater. (b) Logical 
schema of a link extended with a trusted repeater. 
To extend the reach of QKD, an intermediate classical 
repeater can be used [see Fig. 7(a)]. I t is to be noted that 
a QKD link is composed of an emitter side and a receiver 
side. The emitter is typically made up of a laser diode while 
the receiver contains the single-photon detectors, which 
are based on avalanche photodiodes. Thus, a classical 
repeater t is composed of a receiver and an emitter (other 
pairing possibilities exist, but here we stick with the 
simplest one). The receiver links with the previous emitter 
in the chain and the emitter with the forthcoming receiver 
(in the figure, s and u , respectively). The receiver is used 
to establish a quantum channel different from the quan-
tum channel built up with the emitter. Both quantum 
channels create, independently, keys rq1 and rq2 with the 
same length. Then, through the public authenticated chan-
nel, a message m is relayed securely computing a one-
time pad with the QKD keys created before [the logical 
scheme of this process is depicted in Fig. 7(b)]. This process 
can continue with any number of intermediate links, 
but each repeater t will know the message being t rans-
mitted. The secure message m can be used later as a 
key to cipher future communications. Unfortunately, it 
takes only one corrupted node to completely spoil the secur-
ity of the system. This full t rus t condition is not acceptable 
in many cases. 
C. Weakly Trus ted Repea te rs 
A message is information theoretically secure if the 
entropy of the message is not reduced with respect to a 
well-defined adversary and scenario. In QKD the eaves-
dropper is allowed to perform any attack allowed by quan-
tum physics. However, the laboratories of the legitimate 
parties are assumed to be trusted and their devices well 
known. Recent studies show that it is possible to extract 
a nonzero, though significantly smaller, secret key without 
making any assumption on the device characterization. 
This model is known as device independent QKD [46]. 
The secret key distilled by a device independent QKD pro-
tocol improves the security of a key distilled by a QKD pro-
tocol only in the sense tha t it reduces the set of hypotheses 
for information theoretic security. 
If we use trusted repeaters to extend the reach of QKD, 
the key is still information theoretically secure provided 
that the eavesdropper is limited to quantum attacks and 
the (well-characterized) laboratories and devices of Bob 
and Alice as well as all the intermediate repeaters are out-
side of Eve’s control. However, the full disclosure implied by 
trusted repeaters might be too strong in many scenarios. In 
these situations, trusted repeaters are not a valid option. In 
contrast, we can only weakly trust the intermediate nodes 
and consider that some might try to recover information of 
the secret key or message, i.e., the setting discussed in 
Section II. At design time the set of tappable nodes and pos-
sible associations is established. The set can be delimited 
in a rather precise fashion; e.g., any set of l nodes can be 
tapped, etc. Then, the users can search for a secure network 
code tha t fulfills their t rust requirements. Nonetheless, the 
weakly trusted repeater paradigm does not increase the se-
curity with respect to trusted repeaters in a quantifiable 
way; what it offers is the possibility to modulate the num-
ber of intermediate repeaters that a user is willing to t rust . 
I t is in the same sense tha t device independent QKD im-
proves on QKD that the weakly trusted repeaters para-
digm improves on the security of the trusted repeaters 
scenario. 
Explicit code constructions in the general wiretapping 
model is an open problem [37]. However, in the single 
source scenario, secure network code constructions are 
fairly well known [29], and, in simple cases like the exam-
ples from Section II, they can be discovered by inspection. 
Hence, we can readily use this formalism to reduce the 
dependence on the intermediate nodes. 
I V . WEAKLY TRUSTED REPEATERS ON PASSIVE OPTICAL 
NETWORKS 
Assuming a network where nodes can be deployed a t 
will, we can implement directly the first example from 
Section II (see Fig. 8). The distance limitation of a QKD 
emitter a t the source s is denoted by a gray sector. This lim-
itation can be overcome by introducing two disjoint paths 
between the source s and the user u. In contrast to the 
trusted repeaters solution, different messages are sent 
through each path, such that here the key is not fully 
disclosed to any of the intermediate nodes. 
Unfortunately, despite i ts benefits, practical optical net-
works do not have this deployment ease. Instead, nodes 
have to be arranged in specific structures to fit different 
ROADM 
m + k 
m + k 
ROADM ROADM 
m — k m — k 
Fig. 8. The scenario corresponds to an optical network with two 
disjoint paths that are used to overcome the QKD distance limita-
tion. As in Fig. 7, the gray sector marks the distance limitation of 
the QKD system with the emitter source at s. 
geographical, cost, deployment, etc., constraints. The next 
scenario focuses on one of these kinds of optical networks: 
metropolitan area networks. 
As already mentioned in the Introduction, optical net-
works are the preferred technology for commercial telecom-
munication networks. For instance, in metropolitan areas, 
optical fiber and passive technology is widely available, 
making it possible to establish an optical path between 
two nodes. Here we focus on metropolitan area networks 
using only passive technology, since, because of the moder-
ate absorptions, optical paths do not need amplification. 
This means that they are not disrupted a t the quantum 
level, hence being suitable for QKD. 
Metropolitan area networks span from ten to several 
hundred kilometers. Figure 9 shows the typical5 design 
of such networks: a central ring-shaped backbone con-
nected to peripheral access networks. The backbone is com-
posed of multiple nodes, separated by tens of kilometers, 
tha t connect to the optical line termination (OLT) of the ac-
cess networks. These nodes use different kinds of optical 
add-drop multiplexers (OADM), for instance, reconfigur-
able OADM, to route signals to the correct access network 
depending on their wavelength. Starting a t the OLT, the 
access networks follow a point-to-multipoint topology in 
order to serve nodes, known as optical network units 
(ONUs), located in the same zone. The preferred choice 
for access networks is passive technology, and thus the sig-
nal is distributed among ONUs via passive devices like 
splitters of arrayed waveguide gratings (AWGs). The typi-
cal distance between the backbone node and the ONU is a 
few kilometers [47]. Using this structure, metropolitan 
area networks can accommodate many users via multiplex-
ing techniques such as wavelength division or time division 
multiplexing (WDM and TDM, respectively). 
5Actual networks can be much more complicated, reflecting the competition 
over time among technologies and specific growth needs. We consider here 
only the typical model as representative enough. 
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Fig. 9. Exampleofatypical metropolitan opticalnetwork. Thecore 
ring is depicted on top, while the lower part represents the point-
to-multipoint access network. 
The use of QKD in an optical network is further compli-
cated if quantum and classical signals are multiplexed. 
Since a t the quantum level we are dealing with single 
photon signals, any leak of the classical signals, typically 
100 dB stronger, will spoil the quantum channel. Although 
there are studies demonstrating this coexistence (e.g., 
[15,48,49]), its effect basically amounts to increasing the 
noise and, thus, reducing the maximum distance/rate 
achievable. As the only purpose of this section is to show 
the benefits of weakly trusted repeaters in optical net-
works, we prefer to keep the network in the quantum re-
gime and avoid these problems. Thus we assume the 
network is being used only for QKD purposes. An authen-
ticated classical channel is supposed to be available among 
any nodes. 
To secure a metropolitan optical network, a quantum 
channel has to be created among any two nodes of the ac-
cess networks. Therefore, first we connect an emitter to the 
end of an access network. Looking a t Fig. 6 and Table I, we 
realize that losses, because of fiber and network compo-
nents, do not allow one to directly plug the receiver into 
a different access network. Intermediate nodes are needed. 
Possible locations are the immediate backbone node or i ts 
closest neighbors. In the associated graph, this scheme gen-
erates a bipartite graph with emitters placed a t the end of 
the access network and receivers a t the backbone nodes. 
Each emitter has several outgoing links: to the receiver 
in its own backbone node and the neighboring ones. The 
type of QKD device selected for each node is not arbitrary. 
Receivers are more expensive and difficult to maintain 
because of the single-photon detectors; hence, they are kept 
a t the telco installations. 
This shows that not only do telecom networks suit QKD, 
but they are also flexible enough to provide several alter-
native paths among two nodes (at least in metro areas). 
Therefore, the network coding approach described in 
T A B L E I 
INSERTION LOSSES 
Device 
Single-mode fiber 
1 2 splitter 
1 4 splitter 
CWDM add-drop 
multiplexer 
DWDM add-drop 
multiplexer 
Bandpass filter 
Circulator 
Connectors 
AWG (40 channels) 
Operation Wavelength 
1550 nm 
1260–1610 nm 
1260–1610 nm 
1270–1610 nm 
1525–1610 nm 
1530–1565 nm 
1525–1610 nm 
Insertion 
Lossa 
0.25 dB/km 
3.5 dB 
7 dB 
0.6 dB 
0.6 dB 
0.7 dB 
0.5 dB 
0.2 dB pair 
3 dB 
a
 These values belong to low-loss components (except for fiber, 
for which we use the value for the installed in typical links) 
available in the market. 
Section II can be used. This implies tha t a commercial 
optical network with improved security and resilience, as 
compared to the traditional scheme, can be designed using 
QKD and WTR. 
V . NETWORK PROTOTYPES 
A simple scenario where two parties communicate 
through two intermediate nodes can be derived from the 
theoretical framework described in Section II . In this sce-
nario the parties are able to exchange a secret key under 
weak trust assumptions. This simplicity also facilitates the 
implementation of secure optical networks, like the ones 
described in the previous section. Here we propose several 
network prototypes to demonstrate tha t secure telecom 
PON can be implemented using QKD and WTR in metro-
politan area networks (see Fig. 9). 
The first prototype is depicted in Fig. 10. Emitters, 
labeled as Txn, are connected to user nodes in an access 
network, and receivers, labeled as Rxn, are connected to 
backbone nodes. In a backbone node, several passive 
WDM components are included to route the quantum sig-
nals. The objective is to reach from an emitter a t least two 
different receivers in order to have several paths for im-
proved security. A coarse WDM OADM (CWDM) is used 
to route signals within a passband to the corresponding ac-
cess network. Add and drop ports, A and D in the figure, are 
connected to a dense WDM OADM (DWDM). The function 
of this second multiplexer is to filter signals with the wave-
lengths associated with a receiver.6 In this wavelength ad-
dressing scheme, quantum signals can reach a receiver 
from two different directions. Both DWDM OADM are con-
nected to a bandpass filter, Fa , using the reflected and fil-
tered ports. The common port of the Fa filter connects the 
backbone with the access network, thus routing signals 
from the access network to the correct destination within 
the backbone ring. In the access network several emitters 
are connected to the splitter. Fiber lengths are assumed to 
6
 This is one of many possible configurations, for instance, DWDM OADM 
could be replaced by a series of bandpass filters. 
be within the typical distances for metropolitan area 
networks. 
Even though this prototype works under the WDM para-
digm, a wavelength multiplexer cannot be used because of 
the backbone CWDM OADM. Instead, a splitter is used, as 
in GPON. In this way, multiple emitters can communicate 
simultaneously with different receivers, because each re-
ceiver is addressed using a different wavelength. In parti-
cular, in this prototype each emitter can communicate with 
three receivers, all of them within the range of current com-
mercial QKD systems (Fig. 6): the receiver in the immedi-
ate backbone node and both neighboring backbone nodes. 
For instance, in Fig. 10, Tx2 is able to communicate with 
Rx1, Rx2, and Rx3. Since communications between farther 
nodes are unfeasible because of the absorptions, wave-
lengths for the filters Fa and DWDM OADM can be used 
repeatedly all over the network. This reduces the number 
of required wavelengths and simplifies the network 
construction. 
An example to illustrate the operation mode of this pro-
totype is as follows. Assume that Tx1 and Tx2 cannot com-
municate directly because of the absorptions and then they 
want to exchange a key using weakly trusted repeaters; 
thus, they need at least two intermediate nodes: 
1. Tx1 transmits at 1540 nm. The signal is filtered by Fa , 
and it is dropped at the DWDM OADM, reaching then 
Rx1. The total loss budget, according to Table 1, 
is w10.6 dB. 
2. Tx1 transmits at 1545 nm. The signal is filtered by Fa , 
passes the DWDM OADM, exits the backbone node, is 
dropped by the CWDM OADM, and is dropped again by 
the DWDM OADM in front of Rx2. The total loss budget 
is w15.5 dB. 
3. Tx2 transmits at 1545 nm. The signal is reflected by Fa 
and dropped by the DWDM OADM in order to reach 
Rx2. The total loss budget is w10.6 dB. 
4. Tx2 transmits at 1540 nm. The signal is reflected by Fa , 
passes through the DWDM OADM, exits the backbone 
node, is dropped by the CWDM OADM and DWDM 
OADM, and then reaches Rx1. The total loss budget 
is w15.5 dB. 
The logical diagram of the communication is presented 
in Fig. 11(a). Note how it reflects the network coding struc-
ture of Fig. 3. Using the secure keys exchanged through 
QKD, a secret message m can be exchanged between Tx1 
and Tx2 through authenticated classical channels. No in-
formation is disclosed to the intermediate (repeater) nodes: 
Rx1 and Rx2. They act as WTR, and they gain no informa-
tion about the message m although they know either m + k 
or m - k. This simple case can be modified to exchanges 
between farther nodes. For instance, Fig. 11(b) shows 
the case where Tx1 exchanges a key with Tx3. Nodes con-
nected to the same splitter can be handled in a similar way. 
Figure 12 shows a second network prototype. This has 
the advantage of requiring fewer components than the 
prototype depicted in Fig. 10. The bandpass filter Fa used 
to route signals within the backbone is replaced by a 
OADM [^ / 
10 km 
OADM OADM 
FA 1542.5 ± 3 nm 
l k m 
Fig. 10. Scheme of a QKD-PON under the network coding paradigm. Coarse WDM (CWDM) add-drop modules are used to provide a 
channel in the third transmission window, around 1550 nm, corresponding to the lowest absorption band. Dense WDM (DWDM) add-drop 
modules are used to route signals to the corresponding receiver. Finally, a bandpass filter Fa is used to connect the access network with 
the backbone and route signals into the correct direction within the backbone. 
c i rculator , s u c h t h a t s i g n a l s c a n n o w b e t r a n s m i t t e d i n only 
o n e d i rec t ion . I n s u c h a conf igura t ion , a n e m i t t e r c a n r e a c h 
only t h e rece iver a t t a c h e d t o i t s i m m e d i a t e b a c k b o n e n o d e 
a n d t h e f irs t b a c k b o n e n o d e t o t h e r i g h t . T h i s l im i t a t i on c a n 
b e avo ided i n t w o w a y s : (i) a s s u m i n g t h a t t h e b a c k b o n e n e t -
w o r k i s a closed r i ng , s u c h t h a t a n y e m i t t e r c a n e x c h a n g e 
k e y s w i t h a t l e a s t o n e fo rward rece iver ; t h u s , t w o dis joint 
p a t h s c a n b e d r a w n u s i n g t h e full r i n g ; a n d (ii) u s i n g a n 
a d d i t i o n a l iden t i ca l backbone n e t w o r k t o t r a n s m i t s i g n a l s 
m + k m + k 
m — k m — k 
Rx2 
(a) 
(b) 
Fig. 1 1 . Diagrams for network coding purposes corresponding to 
key exchanges between nodes (a) Tx1 and Tx2 and between (b) Tx1 
and Tx3 using the optical network depicted in Fig. 10. 
i n t h e oppos i t e d i rec t ion . N o t e t h a t i n t h i s p ro to type only 
o n e D W D M O A D M i s r e q u i r e d , b u t t h i s a d v a n t a g e d i s a p -
p e a r s if w e s e t u p a second n e t w o r k to c o m m u n i c a t e i n t h e 
oppos i te d i rec t ion . 
A t h i r d n e t w o r k p ro to type is s h o w n in F ig . 1 3 . T h i s im-
p roves i n t e r m s of t h e n u m b e r of u s e r s , r e sou rces , a n d loss 
b u d g e t . N o t e t h a t by r educ ing t h e losses w e a r e a l so in-
c r e a s i n g t h e f inal sec re t -key r a t e i n a Q K D s y s t e m , t h u s , 
i nc r ea s ing t h e overa l l W T R t r a n s m i s s i o n r a t e too . T h e cir-
cu l a to r i s r ep laced by a sp l i t t e r , so lving t h e p rob l em of 
b a c k w a r d c o m m u n i c a t i o n s . C W D M O A D M a r e r e m o v e d 
s ince e m i t t e r s a n d d i s t a n t r ece ive r s c a n n o t e x c h a n g e se -
c u r e k e y s b e c a u s e of t h e a b s o r p t i o n s . T h i s could b e a d i s -
a d v a n t a g e for t h e n e x t g e n e r a t i o n of Q K D s y s t e m s t h a t a r e 
OADM 
10 km 
OADM 
Rxi 5 km 
l k m 
Fig. 12. Alternative scheme of a QKD-PON with circulators in-
stead of bandpass filters. This reduces the number of components, 
but signals can travel only in the forward direction. This means 
that , to recover the connectivity with the previous node, accessible 
in the scheme of Fig. 10, either the quantum signal has to travel 
the full ring in the forward direction till reaching the node before or 
a second ring running in parallel but in the backward direction 
must be used. 
10 km 
1540 nm 
Splitter 
1545 nm 
AWG AWG 
Fig. 13 . Third prototype of a QKD-PON with splitters instead of 
circulators to solve the problem of only forward communications. 
Moreover, the number of OADMs is reduced. These changes permit 
one to use an AWG instead of a splitter and thus increase the num-
ber of users a t the access network. The disadvantage is tha t this 
scheme does not allow key exchanges beyond the nearest backbone 
node (e.g., Tx1 is not able to directly connect beyond Rx2). This is 
not an option with current commercial QKD systems, since their 
loss budget is as much 20dB, but with the expected new generation 
able to withstand 30 dB, this advantage—except for the increase in 
throughput between nearest neighbor nodes—would be lost. In 
this case, other schemes like the first two prototypes can be used. 
able to withstand a t least 30 dB. In this case, other schemes 
like the first two prototypes can be used to exchange keys 
between distant nodes. As a result, backbone nodes require 
only three components: splitters, OADMs, and receivers. 
Now, the splitter in the access network can also be replaced 
by an AWG used as a wavelength optical multiplexer. Since 
the AWG is able to multiplex N wavelengths (channels) 
into a single fiber, it increases the number of users up to 
40 with fewer insertion losses. 
In a basic setup each user is connected to an output port 
of the AWG. Each one communicates using a particular 
wavelength. However, because of the periodicity of the 
AWG, lower and upper spectrum bands are also multi-
plexed. Thus, each user is actually able to communicate 
using more than one wavelength: the wavelength within 
the spectrum band and the corresponding periodic wave-
lengths. This allows one to address multiple receivers from 
a single emitter. In this case, care must be taken in tha t the 
passband of the OADM coincides with a band of the AWG. 
The use of several bands in an AWG is a common solution 
in commercial optical networks, for instance, to separate 
downstream from upstream signals [50]. 
Although all the examples comply with the 20 dB loss 
budget of current commercial QKD systems, a better toler-
ance to losses and higher bit rates is expected for the next 
generation of QKD systems [51–54]. This will allow one to 
put QKD devices in farther away locations and increase the 
number of disjoint paths, limited to two in the prototypes, 
thus improving the throughput and security of the network. 
Moreover, we limit ourselves to the PON realm in order to 
not have to contend with any active switching elements. 
If these are included in the network design, they open new 
possibilities a t the expense of having to deal with routing 
algorithms that might include other security threats . 
A rough estimate of the cost, as a function of the number 
of components, can be used to briefly compare the three 
proposed prototypes. On the one hand, the third prototype 
is the one with fewer main network components per 
branch: an optical divisor (AWG), a DWDM OADM con-
necting the receivers, and a splitter to connect the access 
and backbone networks. On the other, the second prototype 
requires an additional component since the access network 
is connected to the backbone using a circulator and a 
CWDM OADM instead of the splitter. Thus, the third pro-
totype is slightly better than the second relative to the 
number of components. Finally, the first prototype is 
clearly a more expensive scenario with five main network 
components per branch. 
V I . CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we introduce weakly trusted repeaters for 
quantum key distribution networks. The objective is to 
overcome the distance limitation of QKD with current tech-
nology, while improving on the traditional trusted repeater 
model used in these cases. We formalize these WTR using a 
network coding approach and construct information theo-
retically secure scenarios, assuming given specific t rus t 
structures, in particular, tha t there is a t least one nonma-
licious path among the several disjoint paths used. Secur-
ing networks with WTR reduces the strong full t rus t 
dependence that is assumed for traditional trusted repeat-
ers that , in turn , improves the security of applications and 
services relying on them. WTR can directly find its niche in 
organizations with private networks and high security 
needs, e.g., telecom companies, banks, military institu-
tions, or government agencies. In these cases, although 
nodes belong to the organization, they cannot be fully 
trusted (possible eavesdropping in the future). WTR can 
also be useful in network infrastructure where each path 
belongs to a different owner. In contrast to the private 
network situation, here all paths are initially weakly 
trusted. 
Moreover, we have also shown practical scenarios based 
on optical networks and detailed implementations with 
standard components of typical telecom networks. In these 
networks, WTR can be used along with QKD to exchange 
secure keys between two users. In contrast with existing 
proposals, the structure of WTR is simpler and more homo-
geneous, hence facilitating its industrialization. These sce-
narios can easily be extended to exchange secret keys 
among a higher number of users and through more inter-
mediate nodes. Considering a higher number of disjoint 
paths would certainly bring more flexibility to the t rus t 
structures. This approach would, as well, open the door 
to other important topics such as the robustness and 
resiliency of these networks. 
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